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NOTES
UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE-STACKING COMES TO LOUISIANA
Plaintiff was injured when the automobile in which she was
a guest passenger collided with a negligent uninsured motorist.
Neither vehicle provided uninsured motorist coverage for her
damages of $25,000.00. Plaintiff, however, was personally insured
under three separate liability policies,' each furnishing $5,000.00
in uninsured motorist coverage. All three policies contained a
standard "pro-rata" clause.2 The First Circuit Court of Appeal
upheld the judgment of the trial court which limited recovery to
$5,000.00 pro-rated among the three policies. The Louisiana
supreme court reversed and awarded plaintiff $5,000.00 on each
of the three policies. Held, the standard "pro-rata" clause is
invalid where its effect is to reduce recovery on an individual
policy below the statutory minimum.8 Graham v. American Cas-
ualty Co., 261 La. 85, 259 So.2d 22 (1972).
In a similar case, plaintiff was awarded $22,902.63 in damages
resulting from injuries sustained while a guest passenger in a
vehicle which collided with an automobile driven by a negligent
uninsured motorist. For purposes of uninsured motorist cover-
age, he qualified as an insured under two policies issued to' the
host vehicle. Following Graham, the supreme court awarded
plaintiff $5,000.00 on each policy. Plaintiff's personal liability
policy afforded uninsured motorist protection in the amount of
$10,000.00,4 but contained a standard "excess" clause.5 The court
1. Plaintiff, a minor, carried a policy in her own name and qualified as
an insured under two policies issued to her father.
2. The standard "pro-rata" clause reads: "[If the insured has other
similar insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the dam-
ages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of
liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and the company shall
not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this coverage
applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the appli-
cable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance." N. Ris-
JORD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES 292 (Supp. 1967).
3. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1) (Supp. 1962) reads: "No automobile liability
insurance ... shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state ...
unless coverage is provided . .. in not less than the limits described in the
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law of Louisiana . . . for the protec-
tion of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover dam-
ages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles .... ." LA. R.S.
32:900(B) (Supp. 1962)'requires a minimum coverage of $5,000 per person
and $10,000 per accident.
4. Plaintiff's policy was issued in Florida where the minimum uninsured
motorist endorsement is $10,000/$20,000. FIA. STAT. § 627.0851 (1969).
5. The standard "excess" clause reads: "With respect to bodily injury
to an insured while occupying a highway vehicle not owned by the named
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held that the "excess" clause, like the "pro-rata" clause, is invalid
if it reduces the possible recovery on a single policy below the
minimum prescribed in R.S. 22:1406. Plaintiff was allowed to
recover the statutory minimum under his personal policy in
addition to the payments received from his host's insurers. Deane
v. McGee, 261 La. 686, 260 So.2d 669 (1972).
Uninsured motorist (hereinafter UM) coverage first ap-
peared nationally in 19566 when the insurance industry, in
response to threats of compulsory insurance programs from state
legislatures,' promulgated an endorsement to be attached to the
family automobile liability policy. As many states began to adopt
the endorsement by statute,8 the likelihood of an injury being
covered by more than one policy increased, with the result that
insurers attempted to limit liability by including "other insur-
ance" clauses in their policies.9
The "other insurance" condition in a standard UM endorse-
ment normally contains two provisions: an "excess" clause appli-
cable when the insured is riding in a car driven or owned by
another person who has also acquired similar coverage;' 0 and a
"pro-rata" clause applicable when the insured has other available
insurance providing the same coverage." Initial debate in the
insured, this insurance shall apply only as excess insurance over any other
similar insurance available to such insured and applicable to such vehicle as
primary insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount
by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit
of liability of such other insurance." N. RisioPw & J. AusTiN, AUTOMOBILME
LIABILITY INSURANCE CAsEs 292 (Supp. 1967).
6. See Notman, A Dicennial Study o the Uninsured Motorist Endorse-
ment, 43 NOTRE DAME LAw. 5, 6 (1967). UM coverage was actually offered
by some companies as early as 1954. See Plummer, Handling Claims Under
the Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 415 INs. L.J. 494 (1957).
7. For a complete early history of UM coverage see Murphy & Netherton,
Public Responsibility and the Uninsured Motorist, 47 GEo. L.J. 700 (1959).
8. For a comprehensive list of all state financial responsibility laws see
Ghiardi & Wienke, Recent Developments in the Cancellation, Renewal and
Recision of Automobile Insurance Policies, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 219, 244 n.147
(1968).
9. See Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw.
U.L. REv. 497 (1967).
10. See note 5 supra; e.g., if A, a guest passenger, is covered by a $10,000
UM endorsement, and B, A's host, is insured by a $5,000 UM endorsement,
A's insurer is liable only for injuries to A in excess of $5,000 to a maximum
of $5,000. If A and B have identical policy amounts, the "excess" clause
acts as an "escape" clause, i.e., A's insurer "escapes" liability completely.
See also Note, 27 LA. L. REv. 114, 115 (1966).
11. See note 2 supra; e.g., if A was insured by two UM endorsements,
X for $5,000 and Y for $20,000, he could recover only $4,000 from endorse-
ment X and $16,000 from endorsement Y. If both X and Y were for identical
amounts, e.g., $5,000, each would provide $2,500 for A's injuries. See also
Note, 27 A. L. REv. 114, 115 (1966).
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courts concerning these provisions involved the issue of which
"other insurance" clause governed between two different poli-
cies, 12 with little consideration given to statutory repugnancy.
But in 1965, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia applied
that state's UM insurance statute to invalidate an "excess" clause
and granted recovery to a plaintiff guest passenger from his own
insurer despite the fact that he had collected on an identical pol-
icy issued to his host."" This approach began to be applied to both
"pro-rata" and "excess" clauses in many jurisdictions, and today
so-called "stacking"'14 of UM endorsements is allowed in at least
a substantial minority of states.1
Louisiana's UM statute was promulgated in 1962.10 The valid-
ity of the "excess" clause was upheld by the Third Circuit in
LeBlanc v. Allstate Insurance Co.,17 and this decision was fol-
lowed by the other circuits.'8 Although cases involving the "pro-
12. See generally 11 AM. JUR. TRIALS Uninsured Motorist Claims (1966);
see also Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 502 (1961) ("excess" clause v. "pro-rata" clause);
Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1122 (1960) ("excess" clause v. "excess" clause); Annot.,
21 A.L.R.2d 611 (1952) ("pro-rata" clause v. "pro-rata" clause).
13. Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817
(1965), criticized in Comment, 52 VA. L. REv. 538, 553 (1966).
14. Stacking occurs when a claimant is allowed to recover up to the
maximum amount from two or more applicable insurance policies, despite
the Inclusion of an "excess" or "pro-rata" clause In one or more of the poli-
cies. There are at least four situations In which stacking of UM endorse-
ments may be attempted: (1) Two endorsements may be issued to two dif-
ferent insureds covering two different automobiles; (2) multiple policies may
be Issued by the same or by different companies to the same insured; (3) It
may sometimes be possible to attack the UM coverage provided by one
Insurer on top of another carrier's bodily injury coverage; (4) finally, an
attempt may be made to stack the UM coverage on top of the bodily injury
coverage provided by the same policy. See Roberts, Uninsured Motorist
Coverage: "Stacking"; Credit for Medical Payments; Claimant's Failure to
Submit to Medical Examination, 19 LA. B.J. 211 (1971).
15. For a recent article espousing the view that "stacking" Is now
allowed in a majority of states see Comment, 17 S.D.L. Rzv. 152 (1972).
16. Act 187 of 1962, now LA. R.S. 22:1406(D) (Supp. 1962).
17. 194 So.2d 791 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) noted in 28 LA. L. Rgv. 130 (1967).
The LeBlanc decision was based upon an excerpt from 12 COUCH oN INSUn-
ANC E 2d § 45:623 at 570 (1964) In which the author states that the purpose of
UM Insurance is "to give the same protection to a person injured by an
uninsured motorist as he would have if he had been injured In an accident
caused by an automobile covered by a standard liability insurance policy";
see also Allen, Several Outstanding Problems Involving Uninsured Motorist
Coverage, 31 ALA. LAw. 368 (1970), in which LeBlanc is described as the rule
of "limited stacking."
18. Broussard v. Whitaker, 238 So.2d 228 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Long
v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 236 So.2d 521 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); Jackson
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 So.2d 621 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Roll-
ing v. Miller, 233 So.2d 723 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); Lott v. Southern Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 223 So.2d 492 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
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rata" clause were less numerous, it appeared that the circuit
courts would acknowledge its validity as well.19
In the Graham case, however, the supreme court chose to
follow the growing national trend, despite the decisions at the
appellate level. Because plaintiff's host vehicle did not provide
UM coverage, the court appropriately observed that the "excess"
clauses in her policies were inapplicable and that the issue was
whether the respective "pro-rata" clauses were to be given
effect.20 After quoting R.S. 22:1406(D), the court observed that
the statute neither prohibits insurers from offering more than
minimum coverage, nor prevents an insured from recovering the
minimum from more than one insurer:
"What the law does require is that each policy provide not
less than the minimum $5,000.00 coverage. Proration does
not take place when the damage claimed exceeds the sum of
the policies under which the claimant is entitled to recover
benefits under the uninsured motorist protection." 21
In Deane,22 the court turned to the issue of "excess" clause
validity. Citing Graham, they again emphasized that the statute
sets forth a minimum, not a maximum amount that UM endorse-
ments must provide. Because the "excess" clause in plaintiff's
policy would have allowed his insurer to escape liability com-
pletely, 23 it was found repugnant to the statute. The court added,
however, that in no instance would a plaintiff be allowed to
recover more than his actual loss. 24
19. Deane v. McGee, 253 So.2d 655 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), rev'd, 261 La.
686, 260 So.2d 669 (1972); Bailes v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 252
So.2d 123 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs granted, 259 La. 950, 253 So.2d 791 (1971);
cf. Box v. Doe, 221 So.2d 666 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Graham v. American
Cas. Co., 244 So.2d 372 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), rev'd, 261 La. 85, 259 So.2d 22
(1972).
20. "The effectiveness of the 'excess' clause is dependent upon primary
insurance in the host vehicle-a condition not fulfilled under these facts."
Graham v. American Cas. Co., 261 La. 85, 92, 259 So.2d 22, 24 (1972).
21. Graham v. American Cas. Co., 261 La. 85, 93, 259 So.2d 22, 25 (1972).
22. Deane was decided under Florida law; however, the court in dictum
noted that "the decision to apply Florida law is not too significant here. By
our . .. decision in Graham v. American Casualty Company, and the prin-
ciples announced there, we would reach the same result reached by Florida
S.. if we applied Louisiana law." Deane v. McGee, 261 La. 686, 697, 260 So.2d
669, 673 (1972).
23. See Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw.
U.L. REv. 497 (1967).
24. Presumably the "excess" and "pro-rata" clauses will be given at
least partial effect by the courts if damages are less than the sum of the
applicable policy limits; see, e.g., Box v. Doe, 221 So.2d 666 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969).
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In support of its position in Graham, the court cited the
Massachusetts case of Johnson v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,25 and
two Louisiana cases, Box v. Doe2 6 and Wilks v. Allstate Insur-
ance Co.2 7 It is submitted that while Johnson lends some support
to the court's conclusion,8 the two Louisiana cases cannot be
termed authority. In fact, the Wilks case would appear to sup-
port a decision rejecting the "stacking" of UM endorsements. 29
As a result of the decisions in the instant cases, it is now
possible for victims of automobile accidents to double or even
triple their recovery over that previously allowed. The holdings
also assure purchasers of UM endorsements that they will receive
full coverage for each premium paid. 0 Additionally, motorists
25. __ Mass. -, 269 N.E.2d 700 (Mass. 1971).
26. 221 So.2d 666 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
27. 195 So.2d 390 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
28. Johnson is similar factually to Graham. Its holding was based on
the Massachusetts UM statute which reads in part: "No motor vehicle
policy . .. shall be issued in amounts less than the legal minimum .... "
(Emphasis added.) The defendant in Graham, in applying for rehearing,
argued that because the Louisiana statute does not contain the word "pol-
icy," but refers broadly to "automobile liability insurance coverage," it
simply requires $5,000 total coverage and does not prescribe that each indi-
vidual policy provide that amount. The court evidently considered the dif-
ference negligible. See LA. R.S. 22:1406(D) (Supp. 1962); MAss. GEN. LAws
ch. 90 § 34L (1932).
29. In Box v. Doe, the "pro-rata" clauses of two UM endorsements were
applied by the court to divide the total judgment evenly between two Insur-
ers. Damages, however, were less than $5,000. Wilks involved general liabil-
ity policies, not UM endorsements. In Wilks the court held that two primary
insurers, each issuing a policy of $5,000, were solidary obligors for that
amount. If this is Indeed the case, it would dictate a result in Graham
directly contrary to the one reached by the court. If insurers axe liable in
solido for $5,000, the insured may certainly recover that amount from any
one, but he may not recover a total in excess of that amount. Fremin v.
Collins, 194 So.2d 470 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967), a case which did, in fact,
involve UM endorsements rejected the concept that primary UM insurers
were solidary obligors, and intimated that a separate liability might be estab-
lished. This would appear to be stronger authority than Wilks for the Gra-
ham holding. Interestingly, Fremin was cited by plaintiff in the Graham
case at the appellate level, but apparently abandoned in favor of Wilks
before the supreme court. For a discussion of Wilks, Fremin and related
cases see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term
-Insurance, 28 LA. L. REV. 372 (1968).
30. This is the argument most often presented by proponents of "stack-
ing"; see, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Robey, 399 F.2d 330, 336 n.5 (8th Cir. 1968):
"[Sleparate policies issued for separate considerations should afford the
protection ostensibly offered by the insurance companies." Simpson v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 318 F.Supp. 1152, 1156 (S.D. Ind. 1970): "[I]t
would be unconscionable to permit insurers to collect a premium for a cover-
age which they are required by statute to provide, and then avoid payment
of loss because of language of limitation devised by themselves."
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may now purchase more extensive UM coverage by simply buy-
ing several policies.81
However, the cases have clearly overturned more than five
years of jurisprudence at the appellate level, and in so doing,
have created some perplexing problems. First, the situation now
exists in which a plaintiff who is insured under more than one
UM endorsement is in a better position when injured by a driver
with no insurance than by a motorist carrying a minimum liabil-
ity policy.82 Second, a person who insures two cars under sep-
arate policies is now in a somewhat better position than one who
insures two cars under the same policy. The latter will be unable
to "stack" since he has only one policy. He would, however, pay
a slightly lower rate.88 Third, the situation in which a plaintiff
who is injured by joint tortfeasors, one insured and one unin-
sured, may be affected. It is now possible that recovery may be
granted on both the insured tortfeasor's liability policy and the
plaintiff's UM endorsement.84 Finally, the decisions will probably
cause insurance rates to rise.
In a concurring opinion in Graham, Justice Barham observed
that the decision did not "sufficiently set forth legal reasoning,
law, or jurisprudence to sustain the result which is obtained."85
While this may be true, it is doubtful that more extensive treat-
ment could have solved the problems which these cases have cre-
31. Insurance companies have been reluctant to offer more than mini-
mum UM insurance on each policy, see A. Wirnes, A GumE TO UNINSURED
MOTORIST COVERAGE 1.13 (Supp. 1971-72). Act 137 of the 1972 Louisiana Legis-
lature, in amending LA. R.S. 22:1406 (Supp. 1962), may also affect this situ-
ation. Section D(1)(B) of the act requires insurers to offer UM coverage to
an insured in amounts up to the insured's general liability coverage.
32. Act 137 of the 1972 Louisiana Legislature may have, albeit inadver-
tently, rectified this anomaly created by the court by amending R.S.
22:1406(D). Paragraph (2) (b) now reads: "For the purposes of this coverage
the term 'uninsured motor vehicle' shall, subject to the terms and conditions
of such coverage, also be deemed to include an insured motor vehicle when
the automobile liability insurance coverage on such vehicle is less than the
uninsured motorist coverage carried by an insured."
33. E.g., motorist A insures his two cars under a single $5,000/$10,000
UM endorsement at a cost of $12. Motorist B insures his two cars under
separate $5,000/$10,000 endorsements at a total cost of $14. B may now
recover up to $10,000, while A, who cannot "stack," will be limited to $5,000.
The higher premium paid by B (15%) hardly seems to justify his increased
recovery (100%). (Rates taken from PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTOMOBILE MANUAL
Rule 16A (Louisiana Exception Sheets) (1968).
34. For a discussion of this subject see Comment, 32 LA. L. REv. 431, 442
(1972).
35. Graham v. American Cas. Ins., 261 La. 85, 96, 259 So.2d 22, 26 (1972).
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ated. Legislatures in other states have taken steps to clarify their
financial responsibility laws following similar decisions. 86 Per-
haps, this would be an appropriate response in Louisiana as well.
Jeff McHugh David
BEYOND FOOD Am Dsnqx:
ADDED PROTECTION FOR THE INJURED CONSUMER?
Suit was brought on behalf of two minors by their father
against the defendant insurer and its insured claiming damages
for the death of cattle sprayed with defendant's arsenic-based
product. The dip had been allegedly administered in substantial
compliance with published directions. The trial court allowed
recovery. The appellate court reversed, finding that the plaintiff
failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
spray was properly mixed by plaintiffs and, further, that the
plaintiff offered no proof of negligence on the manufacturer's
part. In reversing the appellate court's decision, the supreme
court held, that the mixture was proper and that no proof of
particular negligence was necessary. Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty
Insurance Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So.2d 754 (1971).
At common law, three modes of recovery have been granted
to the injured consumer. The first is under a contractual war-
ranty of "merchantable quality," or fitness for intended purpose.
If this warranty is not express, it is considered to be implied in
the sale or delivery of all products. Recovery in warranty, how-
ever, is encumbered by the availability to the manufacturer of
the defenses surrounding the law of contracts: no reliance,
privity, notice, and disclaimer. Since a great deal of contract
law precludes recovery under warranty, common law jurisdic-
tions have resorted to many fictions in order to circumvent
established rules.1 Moreover, beginning with the decision of the
New Jersey court in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,2
which did away with the privity requirement in warranty re-
36. At least two state legislatures have passed laws specifically prohibit-
ing "stacking" after courts had reached decisions similar to Deane and
Graham, see CAUF. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West 1955); IOWA CODE ANNO. § 516A.2
(1946).
1. This history of warranty is thoroughly discussed in Prosser, Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
2. 32 N.J. 568, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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